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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE O,F UTAH 
J. HENSLEY COTTRELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GRAND UNION T'EA COMPANY, 
a corporation, and C. E. POPE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8396 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
I. AMPLIFYING PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the vital issue in this action is whether the 
Findings of Fact and Judgment (R 229-230) are sup-
ported by the evidence the defendants desire to set out 
in some detail the evidence bearing on the issue of a 
full disclosure to Salt Lake County Attorney of all the 
material facts bearing on the prosecution of the criminal 
action of embezzlement against the plaintiff. 
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This evidence w,as given 1n the testimony of de-
fendant, C. E. Pope, called as the first witness by the 
plaintiff, and Hal Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, and 
Bernard N. Fives, witness for the defendants. 
l\1:r. Pope testified that in the latter part of N ovem-
ber or first part of December, 1953, he contacted Mr. 
Hal Taylor in the County Attorney's office (R 16 and 17) 
and furnished documents .and gave information to 1\tfr. 
Taylor regarding any violation of the criminal laws by 
the plaintiff, Mr. Cottrell. 
On the first meeting with the County Attorney, Mr. 
Pope, who was then accompanied by Mr. Fives, spent 
approximately one hour's time explaining the shortage 
in plaintiff's account and left documents herein desig-
nated as Exhibits 2, 3 and 5 with Mr. Taylor and also 
showed a number of supporting documents to him (R 17 
and 18). Exhibit 2 is the Remittance Report made out 
by plaintiff in his own hand writing showing a shortage 
of approximately $70.00; Exhibit 3, Auditor's Report 
and Exhibit 5 is a summary of figures furnished to de-
fendants by plaintiff, (R 19 and 20). 
1\tfr. Pope stated that in this conversation he gave 
Mr. Taylor a full resume as to his company's set-up 
and operations as it affected plaintiff's employment 
with it, (R 22). 
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After this discussion, Mr. Taylor wanted a copy 
of the contract of employment of the plaintiff, Exhibit 
1, and the cash bond furnished by plaintiff, Exhibit 4, 
(R 23). 
These documents were taken to Mr. Taylor some 
three or four days later and a further conversation took 
place for about an hour in which a full explanation was 
made of Exhibits 1 and 4, (R 24). 11:r. Pope also told 
1Ir. Taylor that plaintiff vvas required to abide by the 
contract, (R 25), and that he (Pope) had been told by 
1V1r. Fives that Mr. Cottrell had been visited twice by 
~lr. Fives, but just when these visits were made he did 
not know. 
On this second visit, after Mr. Taylor had received 
all the documents and reviewed the evidence, he advised 
1fr. Pope that there was probable cause that the plain-
tiff was guilty of embezzlement and prepared the 
cri1ninal complaint charging embezzlement, which was 
signed by Pope, (R 31). 
Mr. G. I-Ial Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, test-
ified that he was now engaged in the private practice 
of the law, but that in the latter part of 1953 he was 
a deputy in the office of Salt Lake County Attorney, 
(R 139). 
He testified that he recalled the visit of Mr. Pope 
to the county attorney's office, but was not sure as to 
the date after the period of time between then and the 
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date of the trial. He recalled that on Mr. Pope's first 
visit with him he was accompanied by Mr. B. W. Fives, 
(R 140-141). He remembered seeing and studying docu-
ments, particularly exhibits 2, 3 and 5, and discussing 
the matter of plaintiff's shortage with the defendant 
company for some time in order that he might get all 
the facts, (R 142). 
He stated that Mr. Pope showed him sustaining 
documents to the above stated exhibits and that he 
desired further inforn1ation and documents and that 
later, Mr. Pope returned, this time alone, bringing 
further documents, including the contract and cash bond 
Exhibits 1 and 4, (R 143). 
After reviewing all docu1nents and discussing the 
situation thoroughly on these two occasions, Mr. Taylor 
testified as follows, (R 143) by Mr. Watson: 
"Q. Would you state what your conclusion was, 
and what your advice to Mr. Pope was~ 
A. I was of the opinion, based on the information 
submitted to me, that there was probable 
cause to believe that Mr. Cottrell was guilty 
of embezzlement; and at that time I prepared 
the papers in a complaint charging embezzle-
ment and also filed-
Q. You so advised Mr. Pope of that~ 
A. I advised him that was my opinion, yes. 
Q. Then you prepared the complaint, and it was 
signed by Mr. Pope~ 
A. That is my recollection, yes. 
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Q. Do you recall, in the conversation that you 
had, whether mention was made by either 
Mr. Pope or Mr. Fives, that Mr. Cottrell had 
reported to the Grand Union Company that 
he had lost his purse, containing some of the 
cash that he had collected on the route~ 
A. I have discussed that matter subsequently, 
and I don't have a recollection as to when that 
information was given to me or by whom. 
I do recall that somewhere in the proceedings 
the information came to me, that Mr. Cottrell 
made the claim that he had lost the money. 
When, I don't know. 
Q. Do you rec,all what your reply was to that, 
as to what effect that would have, if any~ 
A. At the time of the discussion we had Exhibit 
2, which indicated that certain checks had 
been remitted, and cash had not, and I was 
of the opinion that, in view of that, there 
w,as sufficient evidence to go to the jury on 
the question as to whether the money was lost, 
or not, and that it would be an affirmative 
defense, and did not change my mind in re-
gard to the filing of the complaint. 
Q. That is, that would be a defense the plaintiff 
himself would have to set up~ 
A. Yes." 
Then on cross-examination by Mr King, Mr. Taylor 
stated th.at he desired to see and study the contract and 
other documents to obtain all the information possible 
and determine from the contract that a truster-trustee 
relationship existed between Mr. Cottrell and Grand 
lTnion Company, (R 148), and that the money which Mr. 
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Cottrell had belonged not to him, but to Grand Union 
Company. He testified that there was some v.ariance in 
practice between the exact terms of the contract and the 
way it was handled which was that the company per-
mitted the route salesman, (l\fr. Cottrell) to deduct his 
expenses and son1e other items, rather than remitting the 
gross, (R 150). 
Mr. Taylor's Testimony in direct and cross-examina-
tion summarized shows that on the two visits to him by 
Mr. Pope, accompanied the first time by Mr. Fives, that 
all the documents pertaining to the embezzlement were 
furnished and that full explanation of the entire arrange-
ment of plaintiff's employment was 1nade prior to the 
issuance of the criminal complaint with the one excep-
tion that Mr. Taylor does not recall for sure that Mr. 
Cottrell sometimes remitted amounts owing to the com-
pany by checks, vouchers or money orders. Mr. Taylor 
was of the opinion that there was probably cause to 
believe the offense had been committed by Mr. Cottrell 
and he so advised Mr. Pope to that effect and upon that 
advise, l\!r. Pope signed said complaint, (R 155-156). 
After thus testifying, to question by the Court relative 
to how Mr. Taylor determined the an1ount of the short-
age, the following testimony was given starting at line 
7 of page 158 of the record : 
"BY THE COURT: 
Q. Then there is .a true amount that was either 
embezzled, or not embezzled. Now, how did 
you determine what the true amount was~ 
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If there is only one offense and there has been 
one embezzlement, that must have been a 
definite amount. 
A. From the yellow sheet. I believe it is Exhibit 
2. 
Q. Did you rely upon that as the basis of the 
amount of the alleged embezzlement~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is an amount less than .a hundred 
dollars, is that right~ 
A. Yes, it is $70.00, as I recall. 
Q. You had Exhibit 2, or whatever the bond is, 
before you at the time you were making this 
determination, is that so~ 
A. I did, yes. 
Q. What was the understanding that you h.ad 
from the information furnished you, and an 
examination of that document, as to what it 
was, and what effect it had upon your prob-
lem~ 
A. I concluded, finally, it had no effect on it; 
that the money was taken out to protect the 
company against shortages either of inadver-
tence or of embezzlement. 
Q. It wasn't merely an indemnity bond; it wasn't, 
presented to you in that fashion, in any way .. 
It was an actual deposit of cash with the 
company, c.ash belonging to the employee. 
You knew that~ 
A. Yes. I think that is the effect of the bond 
form. 
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Q. And you were aware that l\1r. Cottrell had on 
deposit $80.00 at that time. Were you in-
formed of that fact~ 
A. I don't recall the amount. I know that there 
was an amount on deposit, but I didn't-
Q. Did they tell you the amount~ 
A. As I rec.all, they did. 
Q. Assuming, then, that amount was $80.00, was 
it your opinion, and did you advise them the. 
crime of embezzlement had been committed, if 
Mr. Cottrell were short $7 4.00, and he had on 
deposit $80.00 there, and the employment had 
been terminated~ 
A. I don't remember stating it just that way, 
or discussing it that way. 
Q. I ,am trying to determine what information 
they gave you that led you to the conclusion 
that the crime had been committed~ 
A. Well, I think my thinking about it was, your 
Honor, that there was-I had discussed it-
we generally discussed it in the office-that 
the posting of the bond in the form that it was 
posted, did not excuse or could it be offset 
against the taking of funds that, under the 
terms of the contr.act, he was still the custo-
dian. He was still required to remit to the 
company the amounts he collected, and then, 
if there were an eventual shortage, after he 
had remitted to the company, that the com-
pany could go against the bond to protect 
themselves. 
But, I didn't think that Mr. Cottrell could 
offset the moneys he collected under the terms 
of his contract against the bond. And, to that 
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extent, and for that reason I didn't consider 
the amount of the bond particularly important, 
and don't recall exactly what the amounts 
were. But I do recall we had a discussion 
about them, and I knew he had an amount of 
money on deposit. 
I made no attempt to do a mathematical cal-
culation and deduct the amount of the bond 
from the $70.00, or from whatever was mis-
sing. I took the view that the amount which 
was not turned in on the date indicated on 
Exhibit 2, that there was probable cause to 
believe that he had embezzled that amount. 
Q. Did you understand that the amount that was 
reflected on Exhibit 2 was the final account-
ing, as far as the employee went with the 
company, and that there were no further 
trans.actions after that? 
A. I recall they told me they were going to let 
him go, or had let him go prior to the time. 
Q. You were aware of the termination date? 
A. Yes, I was aware of it. 
Q. l\1r. Taylor, it was your considered op1n1on 
the crime of embezzlement has been commit-
ted by a person, who, under these circum-
stances, does not remit the sum of $70.00, and 
that is the final trans.action, at such time as 
the company is holding in trust for him 
$80.00; and you so advised Mr. Pope? 
A. That must necessarily be the conclusion. I 
don't know whether I advised him of the mat-· 
ter. I finally concluded and consented to file 
the complaint that was filed, and I had that 
information." 
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Ag.ain the court at (R. 163) inquired and the witness 
testified as follows: 
"THE COURT.: You said at the preliminary 
hearing you became convinced that your proof 
would fail. Can you elaborate on that. What 
didn't you have available at the time of that 
he,aring, that you had at the time you deter-
mined there v1as probable cause; or what 
made you change your mind~ 
A. Well, the amounts collected were collected 
in small dollar and a half, two dollars, three 
dollars, four dollars, and so on, and I felt 
even at the time of the preliminary hearing, 
that there was still probable cause, but I also 
felt that supporting evidence would have to 
be presented, to get a conviction, and it would 
probably be necessary to call in some seventy 
witnesses who had actually paid the money 
to Mr. Cottrell, and then show a total short-
age, before this document would be admis-
sible. 
I took the view that this document, Exhibit 
2, was probably in the nature of a confession, 
and that under the criminal law it would be 
necessary for the State to establish the cor-
pus delecti, or, that is, the fact that the crime 
had been committed, before this document 
would become admissible." 
Mr. B. ,V. Fives testified that he had called upon 
and found Mr. Cottrell at home on two occasions. The 
first time, about November 15, 1953, Mrs. Cottrell was 
also home, but in-as-much ,as Mr. Fives did not have the 
records with him he was asked to come back at a later 
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date, (R. 174). On the second visit, about December 4, 
1953, Mr. Cottrell was horne alone and he refused to 
discuss the matter of his shortage with Mr. Fives for 
the reason that 1\tfrs. Cottrell was not home although the 
copies of documents were in Mr. Cottrell's files in his 
horne, (R. 176 to 178). 
l\1r. Fives in company with Mr. Pope called on lvfr. 
Taylor at the County Attorney's office, he thought about 
December 15. That at that time ~!r. Pope had an enve-
lope full of documents which were reviewed by .and some 
of them left with Mr. Taylor and he listened some to a 
lengthy conversation between Mr. Pope and Mr. Taylor 
following which l\1r. Taylor asked Mr. Pope if he had 
some further records, to which Mr. Pope replied he had, 
and that he would make them available to Mr. Taylor, 
(R. 179). He then discussed with Mr. Taylor his visits 
vvrith Mr. Cottrell and what the amount of the shortage 
would need to be for different offenses of embezzlement, 
(R. 180). 
In his testimony in cross-examination he testified 
he was not sure of the dates that he called upon Mr. 
Taylor, but thought it was December 7, that he went there 
with 11r. Pope, he thought, sometime after December 4, 
(R. 183), and he stated that he heard discussion between 
Mr. Taylor and 1\!Ir. Pope for the furnishing of additional 
records and that Mr. Pope was to bring those at a later 
date and that the ~omplaint was not signed at the time 
of the visit he attended, (R. 186-187). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANTS 
ACTED HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH AND MADE A 
FULL AND FAIR DIS.CLOSURE OF ALL MATERIAL FACTS 
KNOWN TO THEM CONCERNING THE VIOLATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW BY PLAINTIFF TO SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, AND THAT DEFENDANT POPE ACTED ON 
ADVICE OF SAID ATTORNEY IN SIGNING THE ·COM-
PLAINT. 
(a) ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED 
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE AND SIGNING OF COMPLAINT 
CHARGING EMBEZZLEMENT. 
(b) PROBABLE CAUSE IS DETERMINABLE BY THE 
·COURT AS A MAT'TER OF LAW WHERE EVIDENCE IS 
CLEAR AND UNCONTRADICTED. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIF'F'S CASH BOND COULD NOT BE SET OFF 
AGAINST SHORTAGE IN HIS ACCOUNT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANTS 
ACTED HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH AND MADE A 
FULL AND FAIR DIS.CLOrSURE OF ALL MATERIAL FACTS 
KNOWN TO THEM CONCERNING THE VIOLATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW BY PLAINTIFF TO SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, AND THAT DEFENDANT POPE ACTED ON 
ADVICE OF SAID AT1TORNEY IN SIGNING THE ·COM-
PLAINT'. 
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(a) ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED 
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE AND SIGNING OF COMPLAINT 
CHARGING EMBEZZLEMENT. 
(b) PROBABLE CAUSE IS DETERMINABLE BY THE 
.COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW WHERE EVIDENCE IS 
CLEAR AND UNCONTRADICTED. 
The detailed statement of facts herein given by de-
fendants establishes that the evidence is clear, concise 
and undisputed that defendant Pope, as the local man-
ager of defendant Grand Union Company, honestly and 
in good faith made a full, fair and honest disclosure 
of all the material facts known to him to Mr. Taylor, 
Deputy County Attorney. Mr. Taylor's testimony is like-
wise definite, clear and undisputed that Mr. Pope fur-
nished all documents required, and made full explana-
tion of all transactions between plaintiff and defendant 
Company, prior to his determination that there was 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Cottrell was guilty 
of the crime of embezzlen1ent and his advice to Mr. Pope 
to this effect and the preparing of the complaint and 
having it signed by Mr. Pope. This was also confirmed 
by 1fr. Fives. 
What evidence is there in the record in the case con-
trary to Mr. Pope's and Mr. T.aylor's testimony relative 
to a full disclosure of facts to the prosecuting attorney 1 
We submit there is none, and sjnce there was no other or 
contradictory evidence the question of probable cause 
was one of law to be decided by the court and the motion 
for a directed verdict should have been granted. 
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The plaintiff in his brief, page 9, states that the 
memories of these witnesses were hazy as to the time 
the visits were made by Pope and Fives to Thir. Taylor. 
It is this matter of dates only that can in any way sho"\\r 
even the slightest discrepancy in defendant's evidence . 
..._t\..nd the evidence of both Pope and Taylor are unequi-
vocal that these documents were furnished by Pope and 
studied and fully understood by Mr. Taylor prior to Mr. 
Taylor's determination that there was probable cause 
and Mr. Pope's signing the complaint on the opinion 
and advice of J\1r. T.aylor. 
Also plaintiff's brief attempts to draw some infer-
ence fron1 the letter of A. W. Watson on probable cause, 
Exhibit 10, see page 10, plaintiff's brief, stating that he, 
l\Ir. Watson, vvas not furnished a copy of plaintiff's con-
tract of employment .and that therefore, ~fr. Taylor was 
not furnished said copy, which is Exhibit I. Such infer-
ence is certainly not justified as it seems more logical 
to assume that J\1r. Watson did not have a copy of the 
contract because Mr. Pope was taking sa;id copy to Mr. 
Taylor. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor definitely states his 
opinion was formed .as to probable cause from his own 
study of the information furnished hin1 including the em-
ployment contract and not by anything stated in Exhibit 
10. Also the inference that there was a deviation from 
said contract as urged by plaintiff's brief to the effect 
that plaintiff was not accountable for collections made 
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can not possibly be seriously considered in the light of 
plaintiff's testimony that he was short in his account and 
his setting forth such shortage in his final report, Exhibit 
2. 
Plaintiff's brief also states as a bare conclusion, 
without setting forth .any evidence in support thereof, 
that Mr. Taylor did not have Exhibit I before him prior 
to arriving at his opinion and issuing complaint against 
the plaintiff. This assertion is directly contrary to the 
positive testimony of Messrs. Pope and T'aylor. 
Mr. Taylor's statement that he considered the cash 
bond .and that it had no effect on his determination that 
the amount not accounted for by plaintiff was $70.00 or 
more and the bond could not be a setoff against this 
shortage, clearly proves that he had this document prior 
to issuance of the criminal complaint. So also is this true 
of the contract, because Mr. Taylor stated he had studied 
its provisions and discussed its terms with Mr. Pope 
prior to issuance of the complaint and even at the trial of 
the instant case remembered the paragraph discussed as 
to the provision for remittance by Cottrell. Against these 
positive statements the plaintiff's brief states that these 
documents were not received until after the issuance 
of the complaint without setting forth the evidence in 
support of said conclusion or inferences indulged in be-
cause of uncertainty as to dates of these conversations. 
Is it any wonder in light of this positive evidence, which 
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is uncontradicted by any other witness or testimony, that 
the trial judge held that the jury's answer to question 
numbered 2(a), 2(d), 2(f) ,and 2(h) and question No. 3 
were not supported by the evidence. 
Under such facts the cases are clear and virtually 
unanimous that the trial judge should render as a matter 
of law verdict in favor of defendants. 
The following statement of the law found in Sec. 
864 of 58 Am. Jur., Witness, is very persuasive ,as to 
how the courts consider evidence. 
•'The general rule that the credibility of a wit-
ness is for the jury does not mean that the jury 
or the trial judge· is at liberty under the guise of 
passing upon the credibility of a witness, to dis-
regard his testimony when fron1 no reasonable 
point of view is it open to doubt. The jury should 
not needlessly impute perjury to a witness. 
"It seems to be established as a general rule 
that when ,a disinterested witness, who is in no 
way discredited by other evidence, testifies as to 
a fact within his knowledge and which is not itself 
improbable, or in conflict with other evidence, the 
witness is to be believed, and especially where his 
testimony is fully cooperated." 
The case of Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, (S.D.) 223 
N.vV. 585, 72 A.L.R. 7 at pages 16 and 17 of 72 A.L.R. 
after speaking of the functions of ,a jury states: 
"It is the theory of our law that the entire 
matter of a trial between parties shall be carried 
on in a court of justice and under the general 
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supervision and control of the judge thereof, and 
that the truth as to the facts shall be arrived at 
upon a consideration of the evidence and proofs 
presented by the respective parties in support 
of their respective claims. The jury, in modern 
law, is merely a part of the machinery of the court, 
and it is the part of such ·machinery that is made 
use of in proper cases for determining the truth 
.as to the issuable facts. But we must not forget 
that the general superintendence and control of 
the court and all its machinery, including the jury, 
rests with the judge, and it is fundamental that 
an issue arising between litigants must be tried by 
a general, rational, or reasoning process, both as 
to the ascertaining of facts and the application 
of the law. This has been the basic theory of the 
common law ever since the rule of reason replaced 
trial by orde.al and wager of battle. The existence 
or nonexistence of ultimate issuable facts must be 
determined from the evidence produced in court, 
whether the determination is made by a judge or 
by a jury, by a process of rationalization and 
judgment, and by the application of the thinking 
faculties of the human mind to the evidence. 
"vV e are too often prone to exaggerate the 
powers and privileges of a jury as a trier of facts. 
We frequently see the phrase, 'It is for the Jury 
to say what the f.acts are.' Historically speaking, 
this may have been true in the sixteenth century, 
but it has long since ceased to be true. The power 
and right and duty of the jury are not 'to say what 
the facts are,' but to adjudge and determine what 
the facts are by the usual and ordinary intellectual 
processes; that is, by applying the thinking facul-
ties of their minds to the evidence received and the 
presumptions existing in the case, if any, and 
thereby forming an opinion or judgment. The 
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data is the evidence received in court, and nothing 
extraneous thereto should enter into the determin-
ation, except to the extent that the sum of the past 
experiences of any individual always and neces-
sarily, as a matter of psychology, enters into his 
formation of judgment or opinion based upon any 
given data. Before there is anything for submis-
sion to a jury, the evidence offered as to the ulti-
mate facts must be such that the application of 
normal intellectual faculties thereto might by the 
customary and normal processes of reasoning ar-
rive at different judgme,nts or conclusions. If 
there is not such a state of facts a verdict should 
properly be directed, inasmuch as any result but 
one would not be a reasonable result, and the 
direction of ,a verdict in a proper case is not only 
the right of the judge, but it is his affirmative 
duty, and just as much and just as proper a part 
of his duty as ruling upon evidence or performing 
any other judicial function." 
The plaintiff must prove in order to sustain his com-
plaint of malicious prosecution the following: (1) the 
criminal prosecution of plaintiff, (2) its procurement by 
defendant, (3) its termination favorable to plaintiff, ( 4) 
lack of probable cause, ( 5) malice in the instigation of 
prosecution. 
The defendants maintain very strenuously that the 
defendants acted honestly and in good faith and made 
a full and fair disclosure of all material facts known to 
them to the prosecuting attorney and that there was no 
dispute as to the facts and therefore the court should 
have directed a verdict for defendants. 
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On this phase of the law it is stated in 34 Am. 
Jur., Section 72, Malicious Prosecution, as follows: 
"It is established that if, in addition to his 
own belief, a defendant proves that before com-
mencing prosecution of the criminal proceeding 
complained of he sought the legal advice of an 
officer selected by the people to prosecute offend-
ers against la\vs, and in good faith fully and fairly 
disclosed to that officer all the information he 
possessed, and he w.as advised that a crime had 
been committed, the defendant has made out a 
complete defense to the action. This is true even 
though the advise may have been erroneous. It 
is sometin1es held that advice from a public prose-
cuting officer makes a stronger case, and also, 
that such advice would be .a complete defense when 
that of a private attorney would not. So, also, 
there is authority to the effect that the individual 
would be protected by the advice even though he 
may not have stated facts which he could have 
ascertained by re.asonable diligence, the reason be-
ing that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to 
investigate charges of the commission of crime." 
A very thorough and exhaustive treatise of this issue 
is given in 10 A.L.R. 2d 1215. 
Also, the defendants urgently request the court to 
read the recent Idaho case of Thomas v. Hinton, 281 P. 
2d 1050. This case gives a careful review as to when the 
court should decide the case. The f.acts are analogous to 
the instant case to a great extent. The trial judge failed 
to grant a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict and the appellate court re-
versed, directing the trial court to enter judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. 
At P. 1054 the case states as follows: 
"* * * There being no dispute as to the facts, 
nor reasonable doubt concerning inferences drawn 
therefrom, the court properly entered judgment of 
nonsuit. (Cases) 
"The rule would seem to be quite general that 
in an action for malicious prosecution the question 
of whether or not there was probable cause is de-
terminable by the court as a matter of law unless 
there is some evidence in dispute which requires 
submission to the jury. (Case.)" 
The rule is, when defendant leaves the matter en-
tirely to the judgment and responsibility of the prose-
cuting officer after a full, fair, and honest disclosure 
of the facts, he is not answerable in malicious prosecu-
tion, which rule is sustained by this court in following 
cases: 
McKenzie v. Canning, 42 U. 529, 131 P. 1172; 
Sweatman v. Linton, 66 U. 208, 241 P. 309; 
U·hr v. Eaton, 95 U. 309, 80 P. 2d 925; 
McCal.l v. Kendrick, 2 U. 2d 364, 274 P. 2d 
962; 
Thomas v. Frost, 83 U. 207, 27 P. 2d 459; 
Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 U. 497, 183 P. 325; 
Singh v. Macdonald, 55 U. 54, 188 P. 631. 
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The anno. in 10 A.L.R. 2d at P. 1240 states: 
''But assuming, that in seeking advice of 
coun!sel, and in acting thereon, he has acted in good 
faith and has disclosed all the facts within his 
knowledge relating to the defense and the accusa-
tion, his defense of probable cause will be estab-
lished even though the defendant should show at 
the trial other facts sufficient to secure his acquit-
tal, which might have been ascertained by prose-
cuting witness, if he had made diligent inquiry 
therefor. It is not necessary that he shall institute 
an investigation of the crime itself, or seek to as-
certain other facts relating to the offense, or to 
try to find out whether the accused has any de-
fense to the charge. l-Ie is not required to exhaust 
all sources of information bearing upon the facts 
which have come to his knowledge, for that would 
be to require him to perform the office of the com-
mitting magistrate; and thus thw.art the very 
purpose of the law in inducing him to seek its 
im1nediate vindication for crimes committed 
against it." 
Sweatman v. Linton, 66 U. 208, 24:1 P. 309 holds: 
"Our court is committed to the rule that a 
full and fair statement to prosecuting attorney 
and acting upon the advice of such attorney that 
there was probable cause is a complete and good 
defense to an action for malicious prosecution 
unless there is some particular evidence or cir-
cumstance, or facts, which would tend to show the 
defendant's disbelief in the fact that he had prob-
able cause." 
Elmer v. Chicago N.W.R., 51 N.W. 2d 707 (Wis.): 
"Criminal complaint signed by railway de-
tective after being advised by district attorney 
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upon sufficient evidence to issue complaint, the 
detective having made a full and complete state-
ment of the facts within his knowledge, w:as based 
upon probable cause as a matter of law notwith-
standing subsequent dismissal of criminal case." 
In line with the law and the positive evidence in this 
case it is easy to see why the trial judge held as a matter 
of lavv that a full disclosure of all the material facts 
bearing on the prosecution was made by the defendants 
to Salt Lake County Attorney and that probable cause 
for the prosecution existed; and also the further finding 
in its opinion that the jury's answer on special verdict 
as to questions 2a, 2d, 2£, and 2h and question No. 3 
are not supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the 
findings of fact and judgment herein are supported by 
clear, positive and uncontr.adicted evidence, that a full 
disclosure of all material facts bearing on the prosecution 
was made by defendants to the county attorney and that 
probable cause for the prosecution existed, and the Find-
ings of Fact and Judgment of the trial court should be 
sustained. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CASH BOND COULD NOT BE SET OFF 
AGAINST SHORTAGE IN HIS ACCOUNT •. 
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The defendants are presenting argument under Point 
II in order to substantiate the Deputy County Attorney's 
opinion even though it is unnecessary to the decision in 
this case according to the authorities heretofore sighted. 
Plaintiff's brief under sub-section (b) of Point I 
starting at Page 12 again asserts that Exhibit 4, plain-
tiff's cash bond, vv.as delivered by Mr. Pope to Mr. Taylor 
sometime after December 7, 1953. No evidence is fur-
nished to substantiate this statement and it is made by 
plaintiff even though both Messrs. Pope and Taylor 
stated that this document was delivered to Th1r. Taylor, 
studied, explained and analyzed by him prior to .a de-
termination as to probable cause and the signing of the 
criminal complaint. 
Also, Mr. Taylor in his answer to questions by the 
court (R. 158) set out herein stated: "that he did not 
think Mr. Cottrell could offset the moneys he collected 
under the terms of his contract against his bond, .and, 
to that extent, and for that reason, I didn't consider the 
amount of the bond particularly important, and don't 
recall exactly what the amounts were. But I do recall 
we had .a discussion about them, and I knew he had an 
amount of money on deposit." That this statement and 
opinion is a correct statement of the law is shown by the 
following citation: 
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20 Corpus Juris, Embezzlement, Sections 50 and 51 
hold: 
Sec. 50 - "The fact that the embezzler offers 
to return or does return what he has fraudulently 
converted, or that he or his sureties settled with 
the owner, does not b.ar prosecution for embezzle-
ment, the offense being complete at the time of 
conversion." 
Sec. 51 - "The fact that a defendant has 
given an indemnity bond is no defense to the pros-
ecution for embezzlement, nor would it seem, is he 
entitled to have it taken into consideration in miti-. 
gation of his punishment." 
To the same effect is Section 56 of 18 Am. Jur., 
Embezzlement, which holds: 
"It is no defense to embezzler that funds were 
appropriated in good faith under the belief that 
the owner was indebted to embezzler in an ,amount 
equal to or greater than, the amount taken. 
"The offense is not condoned by giving col-
lateral security." 
Also the following cases : 
"When principal intrusted property to his 
agent for a particular purpose and agent em-
bezzled it, a subsequent offer of agreement to 
make restitution did not defeat a prosecution for 
embezzlement." (Jorgensen /c. State, 283 N.\v·., 
537 Neb.) 
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"One may convert money of another to his 
own use by paying it out on his private or person-
al debts, and the subsequent restoration of the 
fund embezzled, or the payment of the shortage 
does not expunge or conclusively contradict the 
guilt of one who had completed the embezzle-
n1ent." (McGreever v. State, 300 N.W. 485, Wis.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & 
WARNOCK 
Counsel for Respondents 
1320 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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